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Abstract
Paul Samuelson’s Foundations of Economic Analysis played a major role in defining how 
economic theory was undertaken for many years after the Second World War. This paper fills 
out Samuelson’s account of the book’s origins and corrects some details, making clear his 
debt to E. B. Wilson and establishes that turning the thesis into a book was a long process. 
The contents of the book and its reception are then reviewed.
JEL codes: B2, B3, C0, C6
Keywords: Samuelson, mathematical economics, optimization, correspondence principle, 
operationalism
1 University of Birmingham, UK. This paper was written whilst holding a Leverhulme 
Trust Major Research Fellowship to write an intellectual biography of Paul Samuelson. I am 
grateful to Wade Hands, Steven Medema, Janice Murray, Robert Solow and Roy Weintraub 
and to anonymous referees for helpful comments on this paper.
21. Preliminaries
Samuelson and modern economics
The formative period in the emergence of modern economics was the decade centered on the 
Second World War. This decade witnessed the take-off in the idea that mathematical 
modeling was central to both economic theory and empirical work, two facets of economics 
that were increasingly separated. Whereas some of the most prominent theorists of the inter-
war period (e.g. Frank Knight, Jacob Viner, Allyn Young, John Maurice Clark, or Edward 
Chamberlin) were were uncomfortable about using what would now be considered basic 
mathematics, after the Second World War, economic theory became progressively more 
mathematical. There was a similar transition in empirical work, where there was a change 
from the empirical work represented by Wesley Mitchell and Gardner Means—data intensive 
but involving no formal statistical inference—to the methods of modern econometrics, 
though limitations of the computing power available to economists held back the spread of 
formal statistical modeling and inference for many years. Symbolic of this change in 
economics was the rise to prominence of the economics department at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT). A department of social science that in 1940 was still focused 
on providing service teaching for engineers became, by the 1960s, one of the most important 
economics graduate schools in the world. Economics at MIT was part of not just an 
engineering school, but the engineering school that had received the lion’s share of wartime 
science funding and, with its massive research laboratories and had become one of the pre-
eminent locations of “big science”.2
2 On economics at MIT see the articles in  2014, in particular Cherrier 2014.
3One of the leading figures in this transition was the winner of the AEA’s first (1947) 
John Bates Clark Medal, Paul Anthony Samuelson. As a Junior Fellow at Harvard from 1937 
to 1940, he wrote a series of papers that changed the basis on which theoretical debates were 
conducted in several fields: consumer theory (revealed preference), the theory of 
international trade (the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model), Keynesian economics and the 
business cycle (the multiplier-accelerator model). He formalized the problem of dynamic 
analysis in economics, bringing these ideas together, along with a codification of welfare 
economics, in a book, Foundations of Economic Analysis (1947). For decades, this book was 
a core graduate microeconomics textbook and, for many economists, defined the way to do 
economic theory. For example, in 1960, having read in one of his textbooks that it was “the 
most important book in economics since the war”, Robert E. Lucas (1995) taught himself 
economic theory by reading its early chapters, applying the techniques he learned from it to 
the problems that Milton Friedman posed in his Chicago price theory course.3
Samuelson’s own career illustrates the way economics changed during this period. As a 
graduate student at Harvard he was considered a specialist in a field called “mathematical 
economics”, in which posts were so difficult to find that his teachers feared that he might 
never land an academic position. At MIT, his mathematical skills were more highly valued 
because every student in the Institute was required to study math and physics, but he moved 
very reluctantly because he wanted to remain in Harvard’s much stronger department. Even 
this opportunity presented itself only because a vacancy arose at short notice when staff were 
lost through preparations for war (see Backhouse Backhouse 2014). In contrast, by 1948, he 
was a full Professor who was being sounded out by most of the the leading departments, 
3 Friedman’s treatment of these problems was largely intuitive and graphical.
4including Chicago which came closer than any other university to luring him away.4 He 
committed himself to MIT, where he spent the rest of his long career. According to President 
James Killian, the success of MIT’s economics department was due to Samuelson and the 
distinguished economists who found satisfaction in being his colleagues.5
Clearly, other works were important in the rise of mathematical modeling in economics, 
notably John Hicks’s Value and Capital (Hicks 1939), which introduced many economists to 
more formal general equilibrium analysis, and The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior 
by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (von Neumann, & Morgenstern 1944). 
However though The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior was well known among 
mathematical economists, game theory did not acquire its present status in the discipline until 
much later, and when it did, it was the non-cooperative theory of John Nash to which most 
economists turned rather than to von Neumann’s and Morgenstern’s model of coalition 
formation. And though Hicks might have been first, it was Samuelson’s Foundations, with its 
focus on providing the mathematical and conceptual tools with which comparative statics 
results could be generated, that came to define the way most economic theorizing was done. 
Samuelson’s best-selling elementary textbook (Samuelson 1948), the increasing prominence 
of the MIT economics department, his prominent involvement in debates over public policy, 
and a succession of widely-cited theoretical innovations all served to confirm his dominance 
of economics worldwide, and with it the status of Foundations.6 In considering the origins of 
4 See Maas (Maas 2014). Harvard did not try because they knew he would prefer to stay 
at MIT.
5 Killian 1985.
6 These include the consumption-loan model (Samuelson 1958), the pure theory of 
public goods (Samuelson 1954), turnpike theory (Dorfman et al 1958), the use of the Phillips 
curve (Samuelson, & Solow 1960) and the theory of efficient markets (Samuelson 1965a).
5Foundations, we come closer to seeing the origins of modern, technical economics than we 
do by looking at any other work.
“How Foundations came to be”
Given the importance of the book, it is not surprising that when Samuelson offered “How 
Foundations came to be”, an abridged version of a paper first published in German (1997), 
John Macmillan immediately accepted it for the JEL, telling Samuelson, “How one of the 
great economics books came to be written makes a wonderful JEL topic”.7 In this article, he 
reflected on the book’s origins as a Harvard PhD thesis (1940) and the reasons for the long 
delay between his first having the main ideas and the book’s eventual publication. The thesis 
was not written until 1940, because he was precluded from working towards a higher degree 
by the conditions of his Junior Fellowship at Harvard; publication was then delayed, partly 
because of the Second World War and partly because of the anti-theory prejudices of Harold 
Burbank, the Head of Harvard’s economics department, on whose desk it sat gathering dust 
before being sent to Harvard University Press. 
This paper re-examines the origins of Foundations using evidence from Samuelson’s 
papers (archived at Duke University) and the archives of the Harvard Economics Department 
and Harvard University Press. Samuelson’s own account remains indispensable but needs re-
examination. As people reflect on past events, points that seem significant in in view of their 
later interpretation of their own lives get elaborated and modified so that their stories become 
more coherent (see Tribe 1997, pp. 6-9; Weintraub 2007). Samuelson was no exception to 
this rule. He was a great raconteur who was forever recalling events from his own past. The 
7 McMillan J, January 26, 1998, Letter to Samuelson, AEA Papers, Duke University 
2004-0007, Box 3  (Samuelson).
6inevitable result was that the details he recalled most clearly were those that fitted his own 
perception of his life.
A good illustration is provided by the account of the publication process of 
Foundations in “How Foundations came to be”. Late in life Samuelson paid much more 
attention than he had done earlier to the anti-semitism that pervaded Harvard in the 1930s, 
department chair Harold heading a “roll of dishonor” he sent to his friend Henry Rosovsky in 
1989.8 That animosity could explain why he blamed Burbank for holding up publication of 
Foundations, for trying to limit the print run to only 500 copies, and for destroying the type 
after the first print run. He also remembered Burbank as critical of him as a young theorist, 
writing, “Harvard’s long-time department chairman [Harold Burbank] was no admirer of me; 
long before he had counseled me against working in economic theory before I had reached 
(his) ripe old age of 50+” (Samuelson 1998, p. 1378). Later, in the midst of a published 
denunciation of his teachers’ anti-semitism, Samuelson (Samuelson 2002, p. 519) recalled 
Burbank saying to him, 
“Samuelson, you are narrow. Keynes and Hawtrey are narrow. Don’t take up 
economic theory until after you are fifty. This is what our great Allyn Young used to 
say.” Alas, I had already lost my heart, and aspired to become even more narrow; and 
furthermore, Young had died young, just before his rendezvous with greatness. … I 
was always a young man in a hurry.
8 Samuelson, September 26, 1989, Letter to Henry Rosovsky, PASP Box 63  
(Rosovsky).
9 The presence of non-Jewish students in this list could have been one reason why 
Stolper believed that Samuelson was rejected because of his ability rather than because he 
was Jewish.
7The now-puzzling ageism-in-reverse reported here reflects the different, non-mathematical 
conception of economic theory then prevailing, at least in Burbank’s mind. Theory was not 
thought something that required mathematical agility but the mature reflection and 
experience of an older scholar. Samuelson was in a hurry because, having been diagnosed  as 
having high blood pressure, he expected to die young like his father.
In contrast, the archival record shows that, whilst the book did sit on Burbank’s desk 
for a few months, (presumably, as Department Chair, he had a responsibility to review it 
before sending it to the publishers) it is clear that the timing of the book’s publication was 
determined the availability of typesetting capacity (not all printers could handle the complex 
mathematics involved), and ultimately by the availability of paper (a rationed commodity in 
wartime). It also establishes that negotiations with Harvard University Press were handled by 
Abbott Usher, not Burbank, that the initial order was for 1200 copies (it is a mystery why 
only 887 were eventually shipped, the likely explanation being the availability of paper), and 
that the type was “killed” at the instigation of the printers, who pleaded with Harvard 
University Press that the department had no understanding of the shortage of type metal, then 
selling for almost double its normal price.10 When the type was killed, this was on the 
assumption that the War Production Board would soon revoke controls on the use of paper 
and it would be easy to scale up production quickly.11 Burbank’s anti-semitism had affected 
Samuelson whilst he was a student, and there were ample grounds for resentment which 
10 Wilson, C.W., April 18, 1947, Letter to Alfred V. Jules, HUP; Jules,  A.V., June 18, 
1947, Letter to C. W. Wilson, HUP. 
11 Wilson, C.W., October 2, 1947, Letter to Alfred V. Jules, HUP. Email from Michael 
Aronson to the author, April 9, 2012.
8could have affected his later memory, but the delay in the publication of Foundations can be 
fully explained by production difficulties.12
In addition, because we are effectively tracing the roots of modern economics back to 
the inter-war period, there is also a need to tie down the intellectual climate out of which 
Foundations arose. Samuelson was extremely generous in giving credit to others, notably his 
teacher and mentor, E. B. Wilson, with whom he remained in lifelong contact, but he was 
often vague about what they contributed to Foundations. This may be the result of a certain 
defensiveness in “How Foundations came to be”, for one of his goals in that article was to 
contest the history of dynamics provided in Roy Weintraub’s Stabilizing Dynamics (1991), 
about which he had been upset for several years13. Though this chapter sought to place 
Foundations in the intellectual climate in which it was written, Samuelson took him to be 
suggesting that there was “some mystery, and maybe even some cover up” (Samuelson 1998, 
p. 1381). Thus Samuelson (1998, p. 1383) stressed the extent to which he was self-taught 
through hours spent in the Widener Library, asserting that he found nothing of interest in 
Lawrence Henderson’s sociology, and recalling that when he tried to discuss Willard Gibbs 
with him, Henderson preferred to enumerate the failings of Franklin Roosevelt. There is no 
reason to doubt this, but his remark hardly addresses the question of whether three years of 
weekly dinners at the Society of Fellows, dominated by Henderson, may, directly or 
indirectly, have left more of a mark on his thinking than Samuelson remembered.
For these and other reasons, then, it is instructive to revisit the process whereby 
Foundations came to be.
12 The issue of anti-semitism is discussed in more detail in Weintraub 2014 and 
Backhouse 2014.
13 Weintraub says that this was reported to him by Robert Summers (Samuelson’s 
brother) and Lawrence Klein (Samuelson’s first Ph.D. student). The original version of the 
JEL article, published in German, discussed Weintraub at length.
92. Graduate study at Harvard
Chicago and Harvard
Samuelson began his account of the origins of Foundations by telling stories about his 
childhood, speculating on the link between being precocious and having “ridiculous” levels 
of self-confidence, and his undergraduate education at Chicago. Aaron Director introduced 
him to economics with a very traditional economic principles course, but one in which he 
drew attention to the equation for general equilibrium in Gustav Cassel’s Theory of Social 
Economy (1923). In his final year he took Jacob Viner’s graduate price theory course in 
which, to the delight of the graduate students, many of whom lived in terror of Viner’s 
socratic method combined with a three-mistakes-and-you-are-out rule,  Samuelson used to 
point out mistakes on the blackboard. It was in Chicago that Samuelson decided that learning 
mathematics would help his economics, something that was far less obvious then than it is 
today. A graduate student, George Stigler, had exposed Samuelson to the joys of large 
determinants, showing him notes on a course taught by Henry Schultz, and Viner explained 
that calculus was a prerequisite for a proper understanding of indifference curves and 
production possibility frontiers, though admitting that he did not understand it himself 
(Samuelson 1972b, p. 911).  Having taken Elementary Mathematical Analysis at the end of 
his junior year, Samuelson appears to have taken as much mathematics as he could in his 
senior year, with courses in statistics, algebra, plane analytic geometry and calculus. After 
graduating he took a summer course in differential equations. 
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However, though it was at Chicago that he had decided to become an economist and 
that he had realized the importance of mathematics, the most important part of Samuelson’s 
education took place at Harvard, where he took courses from 1935-7, before becoming a 
Junior Fellow, turning out paper after paper, from 1937-1940. By the time his thesis was 
submitted, he had published 20 articles covering consumer theory, capital theory, 
international trade, unemployment and business cycle theory and was widely considered to be 
the leading young economic theorist. He was using mathematical techniques that left most of 
his teachers behind. Though he acknowledged the importance of Joseph Schumpeter, Wassily 
Leontief, Gottfried Haberler and Alvin Hansen in teaching him modern economic analysis 
(see also Samuelson 1976, p. 27), he made it clear that the main influence on Foundations 
was Edwin Bidwell Wilson. He took Wilson’s courses in mathematical economics and 
mathematical statistics, and spent hours talking to him after lectures (Samuelson 1972a). In 
“How Foundations came to be”, he confined himself to saying that Wilson had vaccinated 
him to understand that economics could use the same mathematics as physics without resting 
on the same empirical foundations and certainties (Samuelson 1998, p. 1376). Wilson had, he 
claimed, contempt for social scientists who aped the natural sciences “in a parrot-like way”.14 
To find more detailed statements about what he learned from Wilson, it is necessary to look 
elsewhere in his writings (e.g. 1947, p. 81; Samuelson 1972c, p. 254; Samuelson 1965b 
[CSP], p. 438]; Samuelson 1967 [CSP], p. 655, 673)
Schumpeter acted as Samuelson’s mentor for many years. He taught the main graduate 
economic theory course, which Samuelson later praised for the range of topics and authors it 
covered (Samuelson 1951, p. 102). They became close and Schumpeter continued to support 
14 This counters the claims of Mirowski 1989 whose work he considered completely 
mistaken.
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him, commenting on his papers and giving feedback on his first presentation to an AEA 
meeting (in a session Schumpeter chaired). Schumpeter was an enthusiast for mathematical 
economics but his command of mathematics was weak. He inspired many students and it is 
possible to see Samuelson as having achieved the breakthrough in mathematical economics 
that Schumpeter sought but could not achieve himself. It was Leontief, better trained in 
mathematics and, by 1935,  teaching the course that Schumpeter had set up to improve the 
teaching of mathematical economics, who provided Samuelson with a more rigorous training 
in formal economic theory than Schumpeter was able to provide.
Though Samuelson disparaged Edward Chamberlin (placed just below Burbank in his 
roll of anti-semitic dishonor), claiming that at the age of 35 he was already at the zenith of his 
scholarly career (Samuelson 2004, p. 4),  his publications show that he thoroughly absorbed 
the content of Chamberlin’s Theory of Monopolistic Competition (Chamberlin 1933), covered 
extensively in a course Samuelson took from him in 1935 and also covered in Schumpeter’s 
economic theory course. Haberler, whom Samuelson remembered much more positively, was 
important because Samuelson’s theory of revealed preference (1938c; 1938b) grew out of 
Haberler’s theory of index numbers.
My own work in this direction grew out of a remark made to me by Professor 
Haberler in his I936 international trade seminar at Harvard. “How do you know 
indifference curves are concave?” My quick retort was “Well, if they're not, your 
whole theory of index numbers is worthless”. Later I got to thinking about the 
implications of this answer (disregarding the fact that it is not worded quite 
accurately). Being then full of Professor Leontief's analysis of indifference curves, I 
suddenly realised that we could dispense with almost all notions of utility: starting 
12
from a few logical axioms of demand consistency, I could derive the whole of the 
valid utility analysis as corollaries. (Samuelson 1950, pp. 369-70)
Samuelson’s theory of revealed preference resulted from seeing that Haberler’s own theory of 
index numbers could be used to show that Leontief, who used indifference curves in his trade 
theory, was right to assume that indifference curves were concave.
Edwin Bidwell Wilson
Edwin Bidwell Wilson is not well known among economists, but his importance to 
Samuelson  and hence to Foundations cannot be overstated. Wilson was one of the two 
protégés of the great American physicist, Willard Gibbs, leading Samuelson repeatedly to 
express his admiration for Wilson by claiming Gibbs as his intellectual grandfather (this 
analogy would, of course, imply that Irving Fisher, Gibbs’s other protégé, was his uncle) (e.g. 
Samuelson 1969, p. 10). Wilson had been trained in mathematics at Yale, where he co-
authored a book with Gibbs on vector analysis, establishing what has since become standard 
notation, and the Ecole normal supérieure in Paris. His first publication, “The so-called 
foundations of geometry” (Wilson 1903) took on the leading pure mathematician of his day, 
David Hilbert. After a brief spell at Yale, he joined MIT as Professor of Mathematical Physics 
in 1907, where he wrote textbooks on calculus and aeronautics.  In 1922 he moved to 
Harvard as Professor of Vital Statistics in Harvard’s School of Public Health, where his 
publications included articles on confidence intervals in statistics. His contribution to the 
Economics Department’s teaching was courses mathematical economics and mathematical 
statistics that he taught in alternate years. In the course on mathematical statistics taken by 
Samuelson in the spring of 1936, Wilson spent several weeks on the first 12 pages of Arthur 
13
Bowley’s Mathematical Groundwork of Economics (1924), his reason for proceeding so 
slowly being that “some of our high-powered mathematical economists did not know their 
fundamental definitions and would read right over a pair of statements that were 
contradictory and assume that both were right”.15 The previous year he had published an 
article in which be pointed out that, though Bowley referred to the marginal utility of money 
in discussing consumer theory, it was only its rate of change that entered into his proof.
However, whilst it seems certain that Wilson will have raised questions about the 
significance of the notion of utility to consumer theory, on which he had himself just 
published (Wilson 1935), Samuelson’s main debt to him lay elsewhere. It was Wilson who 
stimulated Samuelson’s lifelong interest in thermodynamics and the realization that 
economists could learn from physics (see Samuelson PA, 1992, [Answers] by Paul A 
Samuelson, PASP Box 152  (Donald A Walker), p. 3). Though politeness no doubt lay behind 
the remarks, there is no reason to doubt Samuelson’s observation, made to Wilson when he 
left Harvard,
I have benefitted from your suggestions, perhaps more than from anyone else in 
recent years, and even chance remarks which you have let fall concerning Gibb’s [sic] 
thermodynamical systems have profoundly altered my views in corresponding fields 
of economics.16
For Wilson, the main things that economists had to learn from physics were how to build up 
an exact argument and how, when faced with difficult factual problems, to apply existing 
15 Wilson, July 14, 1936, Letter to John D. Black, EBWP Box 27  (B 1935-6).
16 Samuelson, October 9, 1940, Letter to Wilson, EBWP Box 35  (S).
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mathematical tools and develop new ones. After attending his lectures, Schumpeter wrote to 
Wilson, explaining why he found the lectures valuable.
I was strongly impressed with the immense value to the economist of such lectures as 
you gave in the first part of the course. I perfectly agree with those who object to the 
practice of some economists, simply to copy out what they believe is an economic 
argument from textbooks of pure mathematics or of theoretical mechanics or physics, 
and I hope you will not interpret what I am about to say in the sense of that practice, 
which sometimes comes near being ridiculous.
But it is one thing to copy and another thing to learn how to apply existing, and to 
derive the stimulus for constructing new, mathematical tools in the face of difficult 
factual patterns. We must not copy actual arguments but we can learn from physics 
how to build up an exact argument. Moreover we can learn to understand the relation 
of mathematics to the reality to which it is applied. Most important of all is the 
consideration that there are obviously a set of concepts and procedures which, 
although belonging not to the field of pure mathematics but to the field of more or less 
applied mathematics, are of so general a character as to be applicable to an indefinite 
number of different fields. The concepts of Potential or Friction or Inertia are of this 
kind, and the problems and difficulties to which they give rise are formally much the 
same, whatever the subject matter.17
The examples Schumpeter cited (potential, friction, inertia) were presumably ones that 
Wilson had discussed.
17 Schumpeter, J.A., May 19, 1937, Letter to, EBWP Box 29  (S 1937).
15
This view is precisely the one that informed Samuelson’s use of mathematics. He 
learned from Wilson that there were similarities between the structures of economic problems 
and certain problems in physics and that, even though the evidential basis for the two 
disciplines was different, he could make use of these similarities to solve economic problems 
without implying that there was any deeper relation between the physical and the economic 
concepts. The main example of this was the Le Chatelier principle, the idea for which he 
attributed specifically to Wilson’s lectures:
In particular, I was struck by his statement that the fact that an increase in pressure is 
accompanied by a decrease in volume is not so much a theorem about a 
thermodynamic equilibrium system as it is a mathematical theorem about surfaces 
that are concave from below or about negative definite quadratic forms. Armed with 
this clue, I set out to make sense of the Le Chatelier principle. (Samuelson 1972c, p. 
254)
Though the status of the Le Chatelier principle in physics and chemistry has been much 
debated, for Samuelson it was a result that held in any equilibrium system, whether physics, 
chemistry or economics. This was an important idea in his later work. It should be noted that 
though accounts of it are often couched in terms of differential calculus, the principle is much 
more general and applies, as Samuelson showed, equally to systems in which discrete choices 
mean that there is no smooth substitution between variables.18 
Samuelson learned from Wilson the importance of basing economic theory on a firm 
axiomatic framework and of analyzing the general case where functions were not necessarily 
18 Milgrom 2006 discusses subsequent attempts to generalize the conditions under 
which the principle holds, including ones by Samuelson.
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smooth and differentiable. Their correspondence makes it clear that Wilson pushed 
Samuelson to analyze finite changes and, as Gibbs had done, to base conclusions on 
inequalities linked to generalized notions of convexity. Directing Samuelson to the types of 
mathematics on which he was to rely in much of his work, Wilson recommended The 
Calculus of Observations (1926) which discussed many of the techniques that  Samuelson 
was later to use in Foundations and which marked his book out from previous work on the 
subject. It focused on methods for obtaining numerical solutions, beginning with 
interpolation, difference equations, determinants, linear equations and statistical theory 
(linear regression and correlation analysis).
Wilson was also important in stimulating Samuelson’s views on dynamics and 
comparative statics. Crucial evidence comes in a letter dated December 30, 1938, in which 
Wilson wrote detailed comments on a paper Samuelson had recently shown him.19 Even if 
Samuelson’s paper were an early attempt at tackling the relations between dynamics and 
comparative statics, the letter showed that he had not yet sorted out the material to Wilson’s 
satisfaction.20 Wilson thought that Samuelson’s analysis might not be “so general in some 
respects as Willard Gibbs would have desired”. Samuelson had written of certain “secondary 
conditions” and of “a certain form being positive definite”. This caused Wilson to tell 
Samuelson that Gibbs used to talk of “non-negative quadratic forms” and that he used to lay 
great stress on the fact that it was important “to remain within the limits of stability”. Wilson 
appears to have been telling Samuelson not only that he had not stated the second-order 
conditions for optimization correctly (positive definiteness was sufficient but not necessary) 
19 Wilson, December 30, 1938, Letter to Samuelson, EBWP Box 31  (S 1938).
20 It not clear which paper this letter referred to, though it seems most likely that it was 
either this one or a draft of the corresponding chapter of his thesis.
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but also that second-order  optimization conditions and stability were related, an idea that was 
to become central to Samuelson’s work.
Now if one wishes to postulate the derivatives including the second derivatives in an 
absolutely definite quadratic form one doesn’t need to talk about the limits of stability 
because the definiteness of the quadratic form means that one has stability. (Ibid.) 
In an optimizing system, second-order conditions implied stability and vice versa. 
It is also significant that in the same letter Wilson also reminded Samuelson of the need 
to consider the more general case where functions were not continuously differentiable.
He [Gibbs] doesn’t use derivatives but introduces a condition which is equivalent to 
saying that his function has to be on one side or in a tangent plane to it. He doesn’t 
even assume that there is a definite tangent plane but merely that at each point of his 
surface it is possible to draw some plane such that at each point of his surface it is 
possible to draw some plane such that the surface lies except for that point and some 
other points entirely to one side of the plane. (ibid.)
The mathematics of convex sets and separating hyperplanes, which is what Wilson was 
describing, was not well developed, and he went on to say “Just how general a theorem one 
can get I don’t know because I have never worked it out as carefully as I ought to have done”. 
However, it remained the case that Gibbs had pointed out that if one exceeded the limits of 
stability, the conditions Samuelson assumed might not hold. Wilson’s final advice was that he 
needed to explain himself better: “a little more text and not so many formulae in proportion to 
the text might make the whole decidedly easier reading”, advice that Samuelson did not 
always take.
18
Marion Crawford
At Harvard he audited courses in thermodynamics and Fourier analysis. However, 
given the mathematics he used in Foundations, a particularly important course would seem to 
be one he took in the summer of 1936, at summer school at the University of Wisconsin, 
Madison. This was the theory of equations, taught by one of the few women in American 
mathematics, Margarete Wolf. She had obtained her PhD the year before, and two years later 
was to publish, jointly with her sister, a paper on the problems of deriving necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the existence of solutions to linear matrix equations and determining 
the number of solutions (Wolf 1936). Though this material may not have been covered in the 
course he took, it was very close to the topic of “systems of linear equations and determinants 
with applications” described in the course catalog. Given his exposure to Leontief’s input-
output analysis the term before, and his use of the textbook by Whittaker and Robinson, 
Samuelson could hardly have failed to see the significance of this material.
One reason for his going to Wisconsin that summer was that it was not far from the 
home of Marion Crawford, an economics major at Radcliffe College, whom he married in 
1938.  While he was taking courses in the theory of equations and functions of complex 
variables, she was studying money and banking (they took German together). After 
graduation she worked as an assistant to Schumpeter, who rated her extremely highly.  For 
her undergraduate dissertation (Crawford 1937), she undertook a mathematical investigation 
of a concept that had only recently appeared in the literature, the elasticity of substitution, 
applying to it techniques in linear algebra that would have been beyond most economists of 
the time (and which she must have discussed with Samuelson). Her only academic 
publication was on tariff protection in Australia (Samuelson 1939), and Samuelson later 
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suggested that he might have learned more from this than he had acknowledged when he 
wrote the paper with Stolper on protection and real wages that was the first to use the term 
Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory (Stolper, & Samuelson 1941; Samuelson 1994, p. 346). They 
wrote a joint paper on population dynamics, which remained unpublished. It is clear that her 
role extended beyond the typing, for he wrote  that her contributions to the book were “too 
many” and that “the result has been a vast mathematical, economic, and stylistic 
improvement” (Samuelson 1940, preface; Samuelson 1947, p. vii). Given her qualifications it 
seems likely that Samuelson was not exaggerating, though it is impossible to say where, on 
the spectrum running from copy-editing to co-authorship, her input should be placed.21
3. The thesis
In the middle of 1940, as his Junior Fellowship was coming to an end, he took the decision, 
with Marion, that it would be prudent to obtain a Ph.D.22 He composed and rearranged 
material “at fever pace”, dictating some of the material to Marion, who typed the entire first 
draft of the thesis (Samuelson 1998, p. 1377). It bore the subtitle, “The Observational 
Significance of Economic Theory”.23 His use of the term observational in the title is 
consistent with his definition of “operationally meaningful theorems” as statements about the 
world that were in principle refutable (ibid., pp. 2, 3).  This idea had been completely absent 
21 Samuelson always praised his fellow-students, arguing that it was they, as much as 
their teachers, who were responsible for what he called Harvard’s golden age. However, aside 
from specific instances, such as his collaborations with Abram Bergson and Gustav Stolper, 
their precise role in the evolution of his thinking is unclear.
22 Backhouse (Backhouse 2014) discusses this period of his life in detail.
23 In Foundations (1947, p. 7) he  incorrectly claimed that the subtitle of the thesis was 
“The operational significance of economic theory”.
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from his publications in 1937, the first hint of it coming in February 1938, in which he 
referred to his consumer theory, based on index number theory, as being “more directly based 
on those elements which must be taken as data by economic science” and “more meaningful” 
in its formulation (Samuelson 1938c, p. 71). But this is no more than a hint. His first clear 
commitment to operationalism came in the paper he presented to the Econometric Society in 
December 1937 (Samuelson 1938a). It is tempting to link this to discussions he had in the 
preceding three months in the Society of Fellows, where the weekly discussions over dinner 
were dominated by physiologist Lawrence Henderson. Samuelson later played down the 
significance of his contact with Henderson, though he had cited him when discussing 
operationalism in Foundations (1947, p. 5, n. 2). Henderson had used Gibbs’s mathematics to 
apply the idea of general equilibrium to physiology, and when he discovered Pareto’s 
sociology he saw that it could also be applied to social systems. Henderson organized the 
“Pareto Circle”, an inter-disciplinary group exploring Pareto’s ideas, though Samuelson 
claims he found it of no interest and attended only once.24
The term “operational” inevitably conjures up the operationalism of  the Harvard 
physicist, Percy Bridgman which was widely known in the 1930s.25 Even if Samuelson had 
not attended Bridgman’s lectures on thermodynamics,26 he could hardly have avoided him, 
given Bridgman’s closeness to those running the Society of Fellows. However, the way 
Samuelson described operationally meaningful theorems, emphasizing “data” and 
“observation” (a term that is given prominence by its use in the thesis title) has much stronger 
echoes of the Vienna Circle ideas being developed by Rudolf Carnap, whom Samuelson’s 
24 Weintraub (1991, chapter 3) presents the Pareto circle as part of the context out of 
which Foundations emerged.
25 For example, Harvard’s Stanley Stevens argued for operationalism in psychology.
26 He has stated that he took a course in thermodynamics, and Bridgman taught the only 
course listed under that title.
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friend Willard Quine had helped bring to the United States in 1936, and which Samuelson 
might also have encountered through the Senior Fellow, Alfred North Whitehead.27 
Operationally meaningful theorems could be derived through using mathematics. 
Samuelson opened the thesis with a quotation, reproduced exactly in Foundations, from the 
mathematician, E. H. Moore, “the existence of analogies between central features of various 
theories implies the existence of a general theory which underlies the particular theories and 
unifies them with respect to these central features” (Samuelson 1940, p. 1). He sought to 
apply this idea to economics, presenting the theory underlying the theories of production, the 
consumer, international trade, the business cycle, and income determination. It had long been 
recognized that these all involved systems of interdependent equilibrium conditions but the 
novelty was seeing that there existed “formally identical meaningful theorems” in all of these 
fields. Not only would he derive operationally meaningful theorems but these theorems 
would be derived from a common set of underlying principles. The first source of results was 
that equilibria were often the solutions to optimization problems, for propositions about 
individuals could be derived from the hypothesis that “conditions of equilibrium are 
equivalent to the maximization (minimization)  of some magnitude” (Samuelson 1940, p. 4). 
This was not an a priori truth but a hypothesis. The second was the assumption that an 
equilibrium must be stable, for otherwise it made no sense to analyze comparative statics 
results. This was necessary for the analysis of group behavior because at this level nothing 
was being maximized.28
27 One of Samuelson’s friends, Shigeto Tsuru, worked closely with Whitehead and took 
an interest in psychology.
28 Note that phrase he coined to describe this, the “correspondence principle” was not 
used at this point.
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However, when we leave single economic units, the determination of unknowns is 
found to be unrelated to an extremum position. In even the simplest business cycle 
theories there is lacking symmetry in the conditions of equilibrium, without which 
there is no possibility of reducing the problem to that of a maximum or a minimum. 
Here the hypothesis is made that the system is in stable equilibrium or motion in 
terms of an assumed dynamical system. (Samuelson 1940, p. 4-5)
The justification for assuming stability was that “positions of unstable equilibrium, if they 
exist, are transient, non-persistent states” that will be observed less often than stable ones.
After these methodological and mathematical preliminaries, Samuelson turned to “cost 
and production”, stressing that production, value and distribution were all aspects of a single 
problem. He was proposing a general theory and was trying to derive “all possible 
operationally meaningful theorems” (Samuelson 1940, p. 68). Given the traditional emphasis 
on derivatives and marginal conditions, he emphasized the need to consider finite changes. 
It is curious to see the logical confusion into which many economists have fallen. The 
primary end of economic analysis is to explain a position of minimum (or maximum) 
where it does not pay to make a finite movement in any direction. Now in the case 
that all functions are continuous, it is possible as a means towards this end to state 
certain equalities on differential coefficients which will  (together with appropriate 
secondary conditions) insure that certain inequalities will hold for finite movements. 
It is no exaggeration to say that infinitessimal analysis was developed with just such 
finite applications in view. (Samuelson 1940, p. 92)
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Though influenced by Wilson on this point, it meant his arguments applied not just to 
traditional theory but also to Leontief’s input-output models. 
This theme, that the existing literature was confused, continued in the next three 
chapters, in which he sought to show precisely what was contained in traditional utility 
theory. After a few pages on the evolution of the concept of utility, he turned to a 
mathematical treatment of the problem, drawing on his early articles. Revealed preference 
and notions of indifference were used to show how meaningful propositions could be derived. 
He clarified the meaning of concepts such as cardinal utility, independent utilities, and 
complementarity, and devoted a whole chapter to the problem of the constancy of the 
marginal utility of income, important because of the legacy of Marshall’s ideas and because 
of attempts that had been made by Chicago’s Henry Schultz to measure demand functions.
When he turned to dynamics, in the last two chapters of the thesis (covering material 
that also appeared in 1941 and 1943a) he carried on in the same vein, criticizing previous 
generations of economists for failing to investigate the character of the laws they claimed 
existed. If nothing is known other than that supply and demand determines prices, without 
knowing the shape of the functions, he claimed, “the economist would be truly vulnerable to 
the gibe that he is only a parrot taught to say ‘supply and demand’” (Samuelson 1940, p. 
192). Economists needed to derive comparative statics results. The first of his chapters on 
dynamics linked this to the stability of equilibrium. He then argued that economists needed 
explicit dynamic models that explained how, starting from arbitrary initial conditions, all 
variables would change over time. This took the mathematical analysis to an even higher 
level, for it might be modeled using “differential, difference, mixed differential-difference, 
integral, integro-differential and still more general” sets of equations (Samuelson 1940, p. 
196). Even if some of the ideas would have been familiar to economists, he was using 
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mathematical language in a way that only a tiny minority of mathematical economists would 
have previously encountered. He then proceeded to discuss different types of stability, 
illustrating this with several economic examples, including the multi-market equilibrium 
system used by Hicks (1939) and a Keynesian system, such as James Meade, Hicks and 
Oskar Lange were using. Though these were not the same type of supply and demand system, 
he treated the Keynesian system as something analogous to the other market systems he had 
been discussing in his book.  Given that it was not based on optimization, this was the 
example that showed most clearly the importance of dynamics to comparative statics.
Samuelson achieved a number of things with these examples. The first was to show that 
dynamic processes were implicit in familiar economic examples, implying that economists 
could not argue that dynamics was unnecessary. They might not talk in terms of explicit 
dynamic systems, but they were nonetheless using them. The second was to illustrate some of 
the different types of mathematics that could be used: differential, difference and integral 
equations. One of his examples also illustrated stability of the second kind and the notion that 
systems might be subject to random shocks—that they might “take a random 
walk”  (Samuelson 1940, p. 207). He referred to Brownian motion of large molecules 
undergoing random collisions, though argued that before applying such ideas, with the 
possibility that movements might become more variable the longer a system was observed, in 
economics, “some statistical evidence of its possible validity should be adduced” (Samuelson 
1940, p. 208). Another example showed, through familiar examples, that stability analysis 
was not an esoteric matter that economists could ignore but that it was important for deriving 
comparative statics results. As in his previous chapters, the tone was of showing economists 
how to do properly the things that they had previously been trying to do, without success.
25
Dynamic analysis also made it possible for Samuelson to introduce randomness (also in 
one of his earlier examples) and to relate economic theory to econometrics (as the term 
eventually came to be understood). He provided a justification for representing economic 
equilibrium “as simply a statistically fitted trend”, implying that the approach to data analysis 
represented by Henry Ludwell Moore and Henry Schultz, whose work he cited, might have 
rigorous theoretical justification. Citing Lotka’s Elements of Physical Biology (Lotka 1925), 
he noted that a dynamic equilibrium of supply and demand was “essentially identical with the 
moving equilibrium of a biological or chemical system undergoing slow change” (Samuelson 
1940, p. 236). Here, and in his discussions of concepts of stability, he was moving away from 
economics into the realm of mathematics and physical systems in general. He was sketching 
directions in which economic analysis might develop.
4. From Thesis to Book
Chronology
Samuelson’s thesis was an obvious candidate for the Wells Prize, for the best publishable 
thesis in Economics, which brought the recipient $500 (equivalent to two months’ salary 
when he was appointed assistant professor at MIT in October 1940) and also covered the 
costs of publication of the thesis by Harvard University Press. He remembered being awarded 
the Wells Prize in 1941, saying that he then revised his thesis whilst working on fire control 
(designing radar-guidance systems for naval artillery) at MIT’s Radiation Laboratory, 
handing it in in 1944 (Samuelson 1998, p. 1378). However, the Harvard Corporation ruled his 
thesis, examined in December, would not be considered that year. It was not until February 
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10, 1942, that the department unanimously endorsed the recommendation, made by a 
committee comprising Seymour Harris, Haberler, Leontief and Hansen, to award Samuelson 
the prize.
By this time, Samuelson was in his second year at MIT, teaching courses in economic 
theory, mathematical economics (which had a course in differential equations as a pre-
requisite) and business cycles. He had also become involved, through Hansen, as a consultant 
for the Full-Employment Stabilization Unit, at the National Resources Planning Board, 
traveling to Washington every other week. His role there was to help assemble and supervise 
a team that was forecasting consumer demand under varying assumptions about the 
distribution of income across households. He was also getting involved in debates over the 
multiplier and the theory of income determination (e.g. Samuelson 1942b,1943b). In June 
1943, the NRPB was disbanded, and his teaching commitments at MIT rose.29 In addition to 
his economics teaching, he also taught basic mathematics to US Navy officers.30
To focus resources on the war effort, MIT closed down much of its economics teaching 
for academic year 1944-5, and it was at this point, in March 1944,  that Samuelson joined the 
Radiation Laboratory, as a mathematician in the  theory group under physicist Ivan Getting. 
The pressure he was under, working 8.30 a.m. till 6 p.m., six days a week, able to work on his 
manuscript only in the evenings and on Sundays, no doubt explains why this stage of the 
process stuck in his memory. However, he had started revising the book much earlier, for on 
May 29, 1942, he had told Harvard University Press that he was undertaking “fairly extensive 
revisions” and that, due to his work at the NRPB, he would not be able to complete it in that 
29 This is discussed in Maas 2014.
30 The exact date and content of this teaching has not been established.
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year.31 The description he provided of the book suggested that he was planning to extend its 
coverage of business cycle theory, a topic that he had covered only briefly in his thesis.
Progress continued to be slow, despite Samuelson having reporting to Abbott Usher, 
Chair of the Harvard Economics Department’s publications committee, who was responsible 
for liaison with Samuelson and the Press, that he hoped to be able to finish it by September 
194332.  In August 1943 he told Walter Salant, a friend from Harvard working in Washington 
with whom he was discussing the multiplier, that he was “on the home stretch”.33 However, in 
April 1944, he told Wolfgang Stolper that it was only with great difficulty that he could make 
any progress on “the remaining chapters of my own manuscript”.34 It would appear that at 
some point between these dates he had decided to include new material (the changes he made 
are discussed below). Given what he told Stolper, it seems unlikely that it could have been 
submitted before the summer of 1944. There was then the delay, discussed above, before the 
manuscript was submitted to the Press, during which he saw it gathering dust as he checked 
its progress once a month. (Samuelson 1998, p. 1378). Given that the book was sent to 
Harvard University Press in February 1945, this delay seems unlikely to have been more than 
a few months. If, as is possible, it had taken him a long time to overcome the difficulties he 
described to Stolper, in the limited time allowed by his work in the Radiation Laboratory, it 
could have been less than that.
New material
31 Samuelson, June 28, 1942, Letter to David T. Pottinger, PASP Box 34  (H, 1940-57).
32 Samuelson, July 8, 1943, Letter to A. P. Usher, PASP Box 85  (Foundations).
33 Samuelson, August 11, 1943, Letter to Walter Salant, PASP Box 67  (Salant).
34 Samuelson, April 6, 1944, Letter to Abram Bergson, PASP Box 16  (Bergson).
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The modifications he made to the thesis were very substantial and are summarized in 
the Appendix. The most prominent change was the introduction of the “correspondence 
principle”. In the Introduction to the thesis, Samuelson had explained the link between 
comparative static and dynamic theory by writing, “Here the hypothesis is made that the 
system is in stable equilibrium or motion in terms of an assumed dynamical system. This 
implies no ideological or normative significance …” (Samuelson 1940, p. 4). In Foundations, 
that became:
Instead, the dynamical properties of the system are specified, and the hypothesis is 
made that the system is in “stable”  equilibrium or motion. By means of what I have 
called the Correspondence Principle between comparative statics and dynamics, 
definite operationally meaningful theorems can be derived from so simple a 
hypothesis. One interested only in fruitful statics must study dynamics.
The empirical validity or fruitfulness of the theorems, of course, cannot surpass 
that of the original hypothesis. Moreover, the stability hypothesis has no teleological 
or normative significance … (Samuelson 1947, p. 5)
The content of his argument had not changed, but Samuelson had introduced a name for the 
idea and had elevated it to the status of a “principle”.35 Samuelson clearly thought that his 
work was in the forefront of a radical change that was taking place in economics.
An understanding of this principle [the Correspondence Principle] is all the more 
important at a time when pure economic theory has undergone a revolution of 
thought—from statical to dynamical modes. While many earlier foreshadowings can 
35 The index entry for “Correspondence principle” gives three additional pages. On one, 
the phrase is not used, and the remaining two are in a new chapter.
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be found in the literature, we may date this upheaval from the publication of Ragnar 
Frisch’s Cassel Volume essay of only a decade ago. The resulting change in outlook 
can be compared to that of the transition from classical to quantum mechanics. And 
just as in the field of physics it was well that the relationship between the old and the 
new theories could be in part clarified, so in our field a similar investigation seems in 
order. (Samuelson 1942c, p. 1; Samuelson 1947, p. 284, emphasis added)
It is hard not to speculate that he had in mind Keynes’s implied comparison of the revolution 
to be wrought by his General Theory with that brought about by Einstein in physics.36 
The new material on business cycle theory (Samuelson 1947, pp. 335-49) was less a 
survey of business cycle than a survey of the different mathematical methods that could  be 
used to model the cycle. This was a topic on which many economists, several government 
agencies, were actively working, Samuelson being one of many economists in government 
service and academia trying to forecast whether the end of the war would be followed by 
depression, as had happened after the First World War. The basic distinction he made was 
between endogenous models (which explained the cycle as self-generating, determined by 
factors within the system being analyzed) and exogenous theories (which explained 
fluctuations in terms of factors outside the model). The problem of endogenous theories was 
that they required that there was no damping—that the parameters of the economic system 
were such as to generate a system where fluctuations neither faded away nor exploded. In 
physics there were constants that might generate such systems, but there was no reason to 
assume such constants in economics. Thus he was critical of Michal Kalecki (1935) for 
36 He would be familiar with Pigou’s (1936, p. 115) remark that Einstein actually did for 
physics what Keynes claimed to have done for Economics.
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imposing the condition that cycles not be damped. This was a milder version of an even more 
critical appraisal of Kalecki that he had made privately in a letter to Hurwicz:
By the way, have you read Kalecki's most recent "Studies in Economic Dynamics"? 
He has a chapter on “pure” business cycle which, in my humble opinion, hits the low 
as far as method is concerned. In order to obtain his favorite mixed difference-
differential equations he approximates differences by derivatives, but not all the way 
thru - then he would have had a simple differential equation. Also, he makes it non-
linear to maintain stability regardless of coefficients, but he does not integrate the 
system explicitly, nor even write out the non-linear term.37
Samuelson then explained that the problem with linear endogenous models was that 
they could not explain the amplitude of the cycle: as with a pendulum, the amplitude could be 
of any magnitude, depending on where the system started. One way round the problem was to 
drop the assumption of a purely endogenous cycle and to assume that external factors kept 
the system going (though he did not cite it at this point, this was Frisch’s “rocking horse” 
model of the cycle, according to which a rocking horse hit periodically by outside shocks 
would exhibit a continuing cycle). The other was to go for a non-linear model, citing several 
references to the literature on the use of such models in physical systems. An example of such 
systems was “billiard table” theories, such as Harrod’s (1936) in which output moved 
between a full-employment ceiling and a floor. A problem here was that Hansen had shown 
that there was “no (relevant) natural bottom to the economic system” (Samuelson 1947, p. 
340). He favored mixed endogenous-exogenous systems, citing his own work  on the 
multiplier model (Samuelson 1939b; Samuelson 1939c). His point here was that if the 
37 Hurwicz, L., August 29, 1944, Letter to Samuelson, PASP Box 39  (Hurwicz).
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multiplier-accelerator model was augmented with a periodic movement such as a sine wave 
(though not necessarily a sine wave), the system would, subject to certain conditions, settle 
down to a periodicity determined by the exogenous factor. He likened this to the physical 
phenomenon of resonance. In such a system, shocks would break into this, producing shorter 
cycles.
Finally he turned to “Mixed systems of a linear stochastic type”—linear models subject 
to random shocks. Such models had been analyzed by the Russian economist, Eugen Slutsky, 
and Frisch (1933), whose paper he described as brilliant, but Samuelson linked it to Fourier 
analysis and his MIT colleague, Norbert Wiener. What is significant about this is that he 
linked this approach to the cycle to the problem of estimation, citing Trygve Haavelmo’s 
“The probability approach in econometrics” (1944) and work by Abraham Wald. Though it 
was technically much more difficult, he also outlined the problem of modeling the cycle as a 
non-linear stochastic system.
New material in Part I included a chapter, “Transformations, composite commodities 
and rationing” that tackled problems that were of great practical importance in wartime 
(rationing and index numbers)  and which he had confronted in his work on consumer 
demand. This provided him with the opportunity to tackle a range of issues in consumer 
theory, notably generalizing a theorem from Value and Capital (Hicks 1939) on aggregation. 
However, the  most substantial addition to Part I was a fifty-page chapter on welfare 
economics that became the canonical statement of what came to be known as Bergson-
Samuelson social welfare functions. He included this, he explained in a letter to Viner, 
“because the condition of the current literature seemed to me to be in a rather scandalous 
state of confusion and ignorance”.38 Though there was nothing on this topic in his thesis, the 
38 Samuelson, April 9, 1948, Letter to Jacob Viner, PASP Box 74  (Viner).
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origins of these ideas go back to 1936-7 when Samuelson’s fellow student Abram Bergson 
kept asking him, “What can Pareto mean by this 1898 use of the French singular when he 
speaks of ‘the social optimum’?” (Samuelson 1981, p. 224). The problem was that Pareto 
referred to a social optimum as if it were a single point, yet the conditions he proposed did 
not seem to define any unique point. They solved it by making a clear separation between 
ethical value judgements and empirical propositions. Bergson (1938) used this distinction to 
sort out confusing claims that had been made about welfare in the 1930s. Though Samuelson 
(1939a) had discussed welfare in the context of international trade, his first comprehensive 
discussion of welfare came in this chapter in Foundations.
Samuelson’s starting point was a function that was even more general, and with less 
content, than Bergson’s, for it began with a social welfare function,  where 
the z’s are any variables that are thought relevant to social welfare. Any statement about what 
the z’s were involved making ethical judgements. Unlike Hicks, who tried to eliminate ethical 
judgments from welfare economics, Samuelson sought to establish what ethical judgements 
needed to be made in order to derive conclusions about welfare. He began with widely 
accepted judgements, such as that individuals’ preferences “count” (not true, he claimed, for 
Nazi and Communist “totalitarian” states) before moving on to more controversial ones, such 
as those involved in assuming that welfare was the sum of cardinal utilities. Assuming no 
more than that individuals’ preferences counted (implying a social welfare function of the 
form , and that utilities depended on goods consumed and productive 
services supplied, he showed that, to use terminology introduced by Ian Little (1950) shortly 
afterwards, there was an infinity of Pareto optima. All that the production and exchange 
conditions could do was to establish that there was an equation relating the well-being of 
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different people in the system: a “utility possibility function” that determined the maximum 
utility any person could achieve given the utilities of everyone else.
Though it rested on different foundations, Samuelson claimed that this analysis of 
welfare economics completed his static analysis of maximization. Because it was less clear 
what should be maximized, the nature of the discussion had to be very different, focusing on 
conceptual, more philosophical problems. Scientific economic analysis might not be able to 
arbitrate between competing value judgements but it could analyze the implications of 
different sets of values.
5. The reception of the book
Despite his youth, Samuelson was already well known by 1947, with around 50 academic 
papers to his credit, and the publication of his thesis was eagerly awaited. Reviewers greeted 
it with great enthusiasm as a very important contribution to economic theory (for example, 
Boulding 1948; Tintner 1948; Reder 1948; Allen 1949; Stolper 1949). This may be because 
most of them were mostly young, as few of the older generation would have been able to 
follow the book.39 The mathematical appendices were welcomed as providing much-needed 
teaching materials, though the book stimulated discussion of the role of mathematics in 
economics, still a controversial issue (e.g. Boulding 1948, Savage 1948). The teaching of 
economic theory was still dominated by Alfred Marshall’s Principles of Economics (1920) 
39 Reviewers included (ages in brackets) Roy Allen (41), Gerhard Tintner (40), Kenneth 
Boulding (37), George Stigler (36), Wolfgang Stolper (35), Lloyd Metzler (34), Kenneth May 
(32), Leonard Savage (30), Charles Carter (28), Melvin Reder (28), William Baumol (25). 
Samuelson’s fellow students in this list were Stigler (at Chicago), Metzler and Stolper (at 
Harvard).
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which reflected the view that mathematical reasoning should be kept strictly subordinate to 
verbal explanations. In his Introduction, Samuelson (1947, p. 6) argued that Marshall’s 
position should be “exactly reversed” on the grounds that “the laborious literary working over 
of essentially simple mathematical concepts such as is characteristic of much of modern 
economic theory is not only unrewarding from the standpoint of advancing the science, but 
involves as well mental gymnastics of a particularly depraved type”. Where Marshall had 
relegated mathematics to footnotes and appendices, Foundations sought to demonstrate what 
could be achieved through using mathematics in economics. Not surprisingly, some reviewers 
took up the comparison with Marshall. For example, Reder (1948, p. 516) characterized 
Marshall as having sought to clarify concepts, using mathematics when it served that 
purpose, whereas Samuelson “begins with systems of equations and attempts to deduce their 
empirical or operational implications”, concluding that if one follows Samuelson, 
mathematics is far more likely to be useful. In a similar vein, Allen (1949, p. 111) compared 
Marshall’s use of mathematics to the use of steel to provide scaffolding, whereas Samuelson 
used it as part of the structure.
Foundations was also compared with Hicks’s Value and Capital (1939), Reder and 
Allen providing extensive comparisons. Samuelson (1998, p. 1382) later described Hicks’s 
book as “an expository tour de force of great originality, which built up a readership for the 
problems Foundations grappled with and for the explosion of mathematical economics that 
soon came”. However, few reviewers saw the relationship  in this way. According to Roy 
Allen (1949, p. 112), who had collaborated with Hicks on consumer theory in the early 
1930s, Hicks had tried to work out “if not a complete economic theory, at least a full 
development of one particular line of approach”; in contrast Samuelson tried to do no more 
than show the common mathematical basis underlying different fields of economics. More 
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critically, William Baumol (1949, p. 159) noted that the book lacked a theoretical unity, some 
chapters amounting to “collections of his miscellaneous thoughts and brilliant analytical 
sorties lumped together on the basis of some tenuously established common characteristic”. 
Tintner (1948) considered Samuelson’s treatment of uncertainty inferior to Hicks’s.
There was disagreement over which was the most original part of the book. For Lloyd 
Metzler (1948, p. 906), who had used similar methods, the part dealing with dynamics was 
most important. Samuelson had gone beyond Hicks in constructing formal dynamic models. 
Yet many reviewers were disappointed by this part of the book (e.g. Savage 1948; Tintner 
1948; Stigler 1948; Allen 1949; Baumol 1949). Three major problems were identified. 
Discussions of dynamics rested on very special assumptions meaning that there could be no 
confidence in the results; they focused on the mathematics, with very little economic content; 
and no attention was paid to expectations. Gerhard Tintner (1948, p. 499), at the Cowles 
Commission, concluded because Samuelson’s results were very limited, his methods needed 
to be combined with econometric methods so as to quantify the theory. Samuelson, though he 
had undertaken empirical work on consumption and published papers on statistical theory, 
and though he worked with students (e.g. Lawrence Klein) and co-authors (e.g. Robert 
Solow) who did econometric work, never went down that route himself.40 
Several reviewers recognized that Samuelson did not see economics as synonymous 
with constrained maximization using calculus-based techniques. Metzler (1948, pp. 905, 906) 
emphasized Samuelson’s departures from traditional theory, pointing out that he believed that 
the most important problems, including those dealing with the economy as a whole, could not 
be reduced to maximization problems and that he was cynical about consumer theory. 
40 This is a substantial point that is beyond the scope of this paper and will be discussed 
in detail elsewhere.
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Kenneth May (1948, p. 94), a mathematician, was left feeling that the book contained “an 
implicit basic critique of economic theory” in that “much economic theory turns out to be 
banal or meaningless when stripped of its vague literary formulation”. Allen (1949, p. 113) 
noted that Samuelson stressed finite changes and discontinuity and Leonard Savage (1948, p. 
202), a statistician, noted that the economic theorist needed little math beyond “a few ideas 
about continuity and convexity”. 
Though Samuelson clearly attached importance to the Le Chatelier principle, this was 
not something that impressed his reviewers, whether economists or mathematicians. The only 
reviewer to mention it (Baumol 1949, p. 160) did so in a footnote pointing out that 
Samuelson had got a minus sign wrong. The reason was presumably that, though the Le 
Chatelier principle had been an important step for Samuelson, it was not a necessary step: it 
was sufficient to begin with results on optimality conditions and the correspondence 
principle. Though Samuelson had stated (1947, pp. 38, 81) that the Le Chatelier principle 
played a role in natural science, his reference to the “metaphysical vagueness” with which it 
was stated will not have encouraged economists to follow this up.
The range of responses to Foundations showed that, unlike Value and Capital, 
Foundations could be interpreted in many ways. Though Samuelson remained skeptical about 
much of the “neoclassical” orthodoxy that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s—and his friend 
Metzler (1948, p. 905) had gone so far as to claim that Samuelson believed that “most of the 
important economic problems” could not “be reduced to simple problems of 
maximization”—Foundations provided a toolbox to which those who developed that 
orthodoxy could turn (exemplified by the case of Lucas, cited earlier). The techniques Lucas 
and others learned from Foundations increasingly dominated economic theorizing. For 
example, Don Patinkin’s reformulation of monetary economics, Money, Interest and Prices 
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(1956), central to discussions of macroeconomics in the 1960s and 1970s (see Backhouse, & 
Boianovsky 2013) made use of Samuelson’s theory of revealed preference, the 
correspondence principle, and his discussion of dynamics. 
 Samuelson had seen the importance of methods that went beyond differential and 
integral calculus, and from the late 1940s onwards played a major role in the development of 
linear modeling techniques, clarifying the relation of Leontief and activity-analysis models to 
traditional theory (1949), and working with Robert Dorfman and Robert Solow to produce a 
major textbook on such methods, Linear Programming and Economic Analysis (1958). 
Foundations came to be associated with what became the standard approach to theoretical 
modeling relying heavily on the use of Lagrange multipliers and differential calculus, for 
Samuelson did not become involved in literature on the existence of general competitive 
equilibrium, and he remained a skeptic about game theory.41 As such methods came to be 
more widespread, and as more elegant techniques involving cost and expenditure functions 
came to be more widely used, the influence of Foundations declined.42 In part, of course, the 
decline was because methods that were once innovative, came to be routine and 
unremarkable. This explains the pattern of citations shown in Figure 1: citations reached a 
peak in the 1970s, the decade by which the use of mathematical methods became firmly 
established (see Backhouse 1998) but after that Foundations was increasingly displaced by 
books covering newer and different techniques.43
41 This is another story that will be told elsewhere.
42 Later, when trying to generalize the theorem to apply to Leontief and other models 
(Samuelson 1960), he admitted that he had failed to derive a result that applied more than 
locally. However, it seems unlikely that recognition of this played a role in the decline in 
citations of Foundations.
43 Sales figures for the period for the book’s early years tell an interesting story. In 
1948-9 it sold over 3000 copies. After the initial demand was met, average sales from 1950-4 
were under 300 per year, which rose steadily to 873 by 1962. The background to this steady 
rise in the late 1950s is no doubt both the increased use of mathematics and the increased 
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Figure 1: Citations of Foundations in JSTOR articles, 1948-2010
Source: http://dfr.jstor.org. Search for “Samuelson” and “Foundations of Economic Analysis”, 
restricted to academic articles. 
6. Conclusions
Samuelson’s Foundations of Economic Analysis did much to define the way economic 
theorizing was undertaken after the Second World War. It was important both because of its 
contents—it provided an up-to-date toolbox for doing economics— and because Samuelson, 
number of economists. To put this in perspective, AEA membership rose from 5,329 in 1947 
to 11,285 in 1962, with similar expansions in other countries.
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despite being only thirty two when the book was published, was already a well known figure. 
He was widely considered the star of the generation of economists that had come of age 
during the Second World War, acknowledged by the award of the AEA’s first Clark Medal. 
He was already making his mark at MIT, where his presence was a major factor in the 
transformation of a service department focused on teaching engineers into one of the leading 
American economics departments. His articles on fields as diverse as consumer theory, 
international trade, business cycle theory and the Keynesian multiplier, demonstrated the way 
mathematics could be used to resolve confusions in literary accounts of economic theory. 
This gave Foundations, the long-awaited revision of his Ph.D. Dissertation, a significance it 
would not otherwise have had. As economics became progressively more mathematical, with 
graduate students increasingly expected to construct formal models of maximizing consumers 
and firms, Foundations was widely seen as the canonical exposition of such methods. In 
addition, it was an important resource for anyone tackling dynamics or welfare economics. 
This paper fills out Samuelson’s account of the book’s origins as well as correcting 
some details. It makes clear the extent of his debt to E. B. Wilson, who not only drew his 
attention to thermodynamics but also impressed upon him the importance of looking 
carefully at all the assumptions being made, the importance of analyzing finite changes and 
models in which functions were not necessarily continuous and differentiable, and the 
relationship between comparative statics and stability. It also establishes that turning the 
thesis into a book was a long process, extending over two to three years, during which it 
almost doubled in length. The most notable additions included much of the material on 
dynamics and a completely new chapter on welfare economics, as well as the term “the 
correspondence principle”.
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Central to Samuelson’s book was the idea that there were common mathematical 
structures underlying different problems, both within economics and across disciplines. 
Operational theorems could be obtained by analyzing the properties the appropriate 
equilibrium systems. For problems involving consumers and the firm, this involved 
maximization and hence the use of second order conditions. For problems involving 
aggregates where optimization was not involved, comparative statics results could be derived 
by assuming that the equilibrium was stable. The paper contends that, contrary to what some 
commentators have claimed, what mattered to Samuelson was not the analogies with 
thermodynamics per se, but the mathematical structures on which certain physical, chemical 
and biological theorems were based. Results that might appear to be physical in origin could 
actually be mathematical implications of a system being in equilibrium. This was an 
argument for the use of mathematics in economics, at a time when most economic theory was 
conducted using verbal reasoning.
Contrary to popular belief, as his close friend Metzler noted, Foundations reflected the 
view that there was much more to economics than optimizing behavior. Macroeconomics 
required different foundations, for aggregate behavior could not be explained as the outcome 
of optimizations: hence the need for the correspondence principle. Though Wilson left a 
stronger mark on Foundations than did his other Harvard teachers, it is tempting to 
conjecture that Samuelson’s belief that there were strict limits to what could be achieved 
through the analysis of optimizing behavior reflected the influence of Alvin Hansen, who was 
emphatically not a mathematical economist. For much of the period when Samuelson was 
revising Foundations, he was working with Hansen on macroeconomic policy problems, 
notably estimating consumers’ expenditure and trying to forecast postwar national income, 
for which the mathematical apparatus constructed in Foundations was of little use. Though 
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the main influence of such work was on his introductory textbook (Samuelson 1948), which 
expresses a very different view of economics—more institutional and data-driven—it is hard 
not to speculate that the view on which Metzler picked up reflected this work. His wartime 
teaching at MIT and interaction with policy makers had no doubt given Samuelson the 
opportunity to develop his expository skills. This was evident in the material he added, 
notably on index numbers and welfare economics, though in general he failed to respond to 
Wilson’s advice to expand greatly the explanations of what he was doing with the 
mathematics, and most of the material taken from the thesis was unchanged. The book might 
be flawed, but neither the minor mistakes nor the failure to provide an integration of 
economic theory prevented it from being a resource on which many economists drew heavily 
during a period that was to witness a major transformation of the subject along lines that 
Samuelson helped lay down. 
Appendix: Foundations in relation to Samuelson's PhD Thesis
Chapters in Foundations
I. Introduction
II. Equilibrium systems and 
comparative statics
III. The theory of Maximizing 
behavior
IV. A Comprehensive restatement 
of the theory of cost and 
production
V. The Pure theory of consumer’s 
behavior
VI. Transformations, composite 
commodities and rationing
Pages
5-6
23-9
78-80
117-24 
125-71
Material added to/removed 
from thesis 
Discussion of correspondence 
principle
New section: A calculus of 
qualitative relations
New section: Indeterminacy in 
purest competition?
New section: A note on the 
demand for money
New chapter
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Note that pages are those on which significant changes have been identified. Only those articles published after 
the thesis are mentioned.
VII. Some special aspects of the 
theory of consumer’s behavior
VIII. Welfare economics
IX. The stability of equilibrium: 
comparative statics and dynamics
X. The stability of equilibrium: 
linear and non-linear systems
XI. Some fundamentals of 
dynamic theory
XII. Conclusions
Appendix A: Maxima and 
quadratic forms
Appendix B: The theory of 
difference and other functional 
equations
179
184-9
189-202
203-53
258
266
272
274-5
284-310
311-7
327
330-2
334
335-49
350-5
379
380-439
Paragraph on independence added
Discussion of Value and Capital 
and complementarity added
Three sections, on Constancy of 
marginal utility of income and 
consumer’s surplus are a 
completely rewritten version of a 
thesis chapter, reflecting the 
content of Samuelson 1942a
New chapter
Sentence on correspondence 
principle added since Samuelson 
1941
Figure illustrating offer curves 
added in Samuelson 1941
Two sentences on imperfect 
stability omitted since Samuelson 
1941
Discussion of Lange 1942 and 
Lange 1944 added since 
Samuelson 1941
New chapter (Samuelson 1942c)
New Section: Statics and 
Dynamics. All but one page is 
included in Samuelson 1943a.
Final paragraph on stability of 
equilibrium changed
Discussion of “what processes 
shall be described as equilibrium 
processes?” added
Phrase “physical systems” 
corrected to “conservative 
physical systems”
Six sections on business cycles 
added
New chapter
Two clarificatory sentences added
New chapter
43
References
Works in Samuelson’s Collected Scientific Papers are cited as “CSP n:m” where n is the 
volume and m the article number. Page references are to the original, often available online.
EBWP - Edwin Bidwell Wilson Papers, Harvard University, HUG4878.203
HUP - Archives of Harvard University Press, Foundations of Economic Analysis folder.
PASP - Paul A. Samuelson Papers, Rubenstein Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Duke 
University (followed by Box number and folder name).
Allen, R.G.D., 1949, The Mathematical Foundations of Economic Theory, The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 63(1), pp. 111-27.
Backhouse, R.E., 1998, The Transformation of U.S. Economics, 1920-1960, Viewed Through 
a Survey of Journal Articles, History of Political Economy, 30(Supplement), pp. 
85-107.
Backhouse, R.E., 2014, Paul Samuelson's Move to MIT, History of Political Economy. 
(Forthcoming).
Backhouse, R. E., Boianovsky, M., 2013. Transforming Modern Macroeconomics: Searching 
for Disequilibrium Microfoundations, 1956-2003, . Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge.
Baumol, W.J., 1949, Relaying the Foundations, Economica, 16(62), pp. 159-68.
Bergson, A., 1938, A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics, The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 52(2), pp. 310-34.
44
Boulding, K.E., 1948, Samuelson's Foundations: The Role of Mathematics in Economics, 
Journal of Political Economy, 56(3), pp. 187-99.
Bowley, A. L., 1924. Mathematical Groundwork of Economics, . Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Cassel, G., 1923. Theory of Social Economy, . Fisher Unwin, London.
Chamberlin, E. H., 1933. The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, . Harvard University 
Press, Cambriedge, MA.
Cherrier, B., 2014, Toward a History of Economics at MIT, 1940-1972, History of Political 
Economy. (Forthcoming).
Crawford ME. 1937. A Mathematical Reconsideration of the Elasticity of Substitution. 
IMG_9019.JPG and 41 others.pdf Thesis. 
Dorfman, R., Samuelson, P. A., Solow, R. M., 1958. Linear Programming and Economic 
Analysis, . McGraw Hill, New York.
Frisch, R. 1933 [1933]. Propagation problems and impulse problems in dynamic economics, 
in Economic Essays in Honor of Gustav Cassel, Allen and Unwin, London,.
Haavelmo, T., 1944, The Probability Approach in Econometrics, Econometrica, 12, pp. iii-vi
+1-115.
Harrod, R. F., 1936. The Trade Cycle, . Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Hicks, J. R., 1939. Value and Capital, . Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Kalecki, M., 1935, A Macrodynamic Theory of Business Cycles, Econometrica, 3(3), pp. 
327-44.
Killian, J. R., 1985. The education of a college president : a memoir, . MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Mass..
Lange, O., 1942, Abstract of "The Stability of Economic Equilibrium", Econometrica, 10, pp. 
176-7.
45
Lange, O., 1944. Price Flexibility and Employment, . Principia Press, Bloomington, IN.
Little, I. M. D., 1950. A Critique of Welfare Economics, . Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Lotka, A. J., 1925. Elements of Physical Biology, . Williams and Wilkins, Baltimore, MD.
Lucas, RE 1995, Robert E. Lucas, Jr. - Biographical,  Retrieved December 16, 2013,  from 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1995/lucas-
bio.html
Maas, H.J.B., 2014, Making Things Technical: Samuelson at MIT, History of Political 
Economy, forthcoming.
Marshall, A., 1920. Principles of Economics: An Introductory Volume, 8th ed. . Macmillan, 
London.
May, K., 1948, Science & Society, 13(1), pp. 93-5.
Metzler, L.A., 1948, The American Economic Review, 38(5), pp. 905-10.
Milgrom, P. 2006. Multipliers and the LeChatelier principle, in M Szenberg, L Ramrattan & 
AA Gottesman (eds), Samuelsonian Economics and the Twenty-First Century, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford,.
Mirowski, P., 1989. More Heat than Light, . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Patinkin, D., 1956. Money, Interest and Prices, . Row, Peterson, Evanston, IL.
Pigou, A.C., 1936, Mr. J. M. Keynes' General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, 
Economica, 3(10), pp. 115-32.
Reder, M.W., 1948, Professor Samuelson on the Foundations of Economic Analysis, The 
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science / Revue Canadienne 
D'Economique Et De Science Politique, 14(4), pp. 516-30.
Robinson, G., 1926. The calculus of observations : a treatise on numerical mathematics / by 
E. T. Whittaker and G. Robinson, . London : Blackie, London.
46
Samuelson, M.C., 1939, The Australian Case for Protection Reexamined, The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 54(1), pp. 143-9.
Samuelson, P.A., 1938a, The Empirical Implications of Utility Analysis, Econometrica, 6(4), 
pp. 344-56. CSP 1:3.
Samuelson, P.A., 1938b, A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer's Behaviour: An 
Addendum, Economica, 5(19), pp. 353-4. CSP 1:1.
Samuelson, P.A., 1938c, A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer's Behaviour, Economica, 
5(17), pp. 61-71. CSP 1:1.
Samuelson, P.A., 1939a, The Gains From International Trade, The Canadian Journal of 
Economics and Political Science / Revue Canadienne D'Economique Et De Science 
Politique, 5(2), pp. 195-205. CSP 2:61.
Samuelson, P.A., 1939b, Interactions Between the Multiplier Analysis and the Principle of 
Acceleration, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 21(2), pp. 75-8. CSP 2:82.
Samuelson, P.A., 1939c, A Synthesis of the Principle of Acceleration and the Multiplier, 
Journal of Political Economy, 47(6), pp. 786-97. CSP 2:83.
Samuelson, P.A., 1941, The Stability of Equilibrium: Comparative Statics and Dynamics, 
Econometrica, 9(2), pp. 97-120. CSP 1:38.
Samuelson, P.A. 1942a. Constancy of marginal utility of income, in O Lange (ed), Studies in 
Mathematical Economics and Econometrics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
pp. 75-91. CSP 1:5.
Samuelson, P.A., 1942b, Fiscal Policy and Income Determination, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 56(4), pp. 575-605. CSP 2:86.
Samuelson, P.A., 1942c, The Stability of Equilibrium: Linear and Nonlinear Systems, 
Econometrica, 10(1), pp. 1-25. CSP 1:40.
47
Samuelson, P.A., 1943a, Dynamics, Statics, and the Stationary State, The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 25(1), pp. 58-68. CSP 1:19.
Samuelson, P.A. 1943b. Full employment after the war, in SE Harris (ed), Postwar Economic 
Problems, McGraw Hill, New York, pp. 27-53. CSP 2:108.
Samuelson, P. A., 1947. Foundations of Economic Analysis, . Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA.
Samuelson, P. A., 1948. Economics: An Introductory Analysis, 1 ed. . McGraw Hill, New 
York.
Samuelson, P. A., 1949. Market Mechanisms and Maximization, , Vol. P-69. RAND, Santa 
Monica, CA.
Samuelson, P.A., 1950, The Problem of Integrability in Utility Theory, Economica, 17(68), 
pp. 355-85. CSP 1:10.
Samuelson, P.A., 1951, Schumpeter As a Teacher and Economic Theorist, The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 33(2), pp. 98-103. CSP 2:116.
Samuelson, P.A., 1954, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, The Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 36(4), pp. 387-9. CSP 2:92.
Samuelson, P.A., 1958, An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with or Without the 
Social Contrivance of Money, Journal of Political Economy, 66(6), pp. 467-82. CSP 
1:21.
Samuelson, P.A., 1960, An Extension of the Lechatelier Principle, Econometrica, 28(2), pp. 
368-79. CSP 1:42.
Samuelson, P.A., 1965a, Proof That Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly, 
Industrial Management Review, 6, pp. 41-9.
48
Samuelson, P.A. 1965b. Some notions of causality and teleology in economics, in D Lerner 
(ed), Cause and Effect, Free Press, New York,. CSP 3:169.
Samuelson, P. A., 1966a. The collected scientific papers of Paul A. Samuelson, Volume 2, 
Stiglitz, J.E.(ed.), . MIT Press, Cambriodge, MA.
Samuelson, P. A., 1966b. The collected scientific papers of Paul A. Samuelson, Volume 1, 
Stiglitz, J.E.(ed.), . MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Samuelson, P.A. 1967. Irving Fisher and the theory of capital, in W Fellner (ed), Ten 
Economic Studies in the Tradition of Irving Fisher, John Wiley, New York,. CSP 
3:184.
Samuelson, P.A. 1969. The way of an economist, in PA Samuelson (ed), International 
Economic Relations: Proceedings of the Third Congress of the International 
Economic Association, Macmillan, London, pp. 1-11. CSP 3:186.
Samuelson, P.A. 1972a. Economics in a golden age: a personal memoir, in G Holton (ed), The 
Twentieth-Century Sciences: Studies in the BIography of Ideas, W. W. Norton, New 
York,. CSP 4:278.
Samuelson, P.A., 1972b, Jacob Viner, 1892-1970, Journal of Political Economy, 80(1), pp. 
5-11. CSP 4:282.
Samuelson, P.A., 1972c, Maximum Principles in Analytical Economics, The American 
Economic Review, 62(3), pp. 249-62.
Samuelson, P.A., 1976, Alvin Hansen As a Creative Economic Theorist, The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 90(1), pp. 24-31. CSP 4:285.
Samuelson, P. A., 1977. The collected scientific papers of Paul A. Samuelson, Volume 4, 
Crowley, K., Nagatani, H. (eds), . MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
49
Samuelson, P.A. 1981. Bergsonian welfare economics, in S Rosefielde (ed), Economic 
Welfare and the Economics of Soviet Socialism: Essays in Honor of Abram Bergson, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 223-66. CSP 5:293.
Samuelson, P. A., 1986. The collected scientific papers of Paul A. Samuelson, Volume 5, 
Crowley, K.(ed.), . MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Samuelson, P.A. 1994. Tribute to Wolfgand Stolper on the fiftieth anniversary of the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem, in AV Deardorff & RM Stern (eds), The Stolper-Samuelson 
Theorem: A Golden Jubilee, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, pp. 343-9. CSP 
7:544.
Samuelson, P.A. 1997. How Foundations came to be, in J Niehans, PA Samuelson & CCV 
Weizsacker (eds), Paul A. Samuelson's "Foundations of Economic Analysis", 
Vademecum zu einem Klassiker der Gegenwart, Verlag Wirtschaft und Finanzen, 
Dusseldorf, pp. 27-52. CSP 7:586.
Samuelson, P.A., 1998, How Foundations Came to Be, Journal of Economic Literature, 
36(3), pp. 1375-86. CSP 7:586.
Samuelson, P.A. 2002. Pastiches from an earlier politically incorrect academic age, in H Lim, 
US Park & GC Harcourt (eds), Editing Economics: Easays in Honour of Mark 
Perlman, Routledge, London, pp. 47-55. CSP 7:593.
Samuelson, P.A. 2004. Portrait of the master as a young man, in E Dietzenbacher & ML Lahr 
(eds), Wassily Leontief and Input-Output Economics, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, pp. 3-8. CSP 7:562.
Samuelson, P. A., 2011a. The collected scientific papers of Paul A. Samuelson, Volume 6, 
Murray, J.(ed.), . MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
50
Samuelson, P. A., 2011b. The collected scientific papers of Paul A. Samuelson, Volume 7, 
Murray, J.(ed.), . MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Samuelson, P.A. & Solow, R.M., 1960, Analytical Aspects of Anti-Inflation Policy, The 
American Economic Review, 50(2), pp. 177-94.
Samuelson, P. A., Merton, R. C., 1972. The collected scientific papers of Paul A. Samuelson, 
Volume 3, . MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Samuelson PA. 1940. Foundations of Analytical Economics: The Observational Significance 
of Economic Theory. Foundations of analytical economics.pdf Thesis. 
Savage, L.J., 1948, Samuelson's Foundations: Its Mathematics, Journal of Political Economy, 
56(3), pp. 200-2.
Stigler, G.J., 1948, [untitled], Journal of the American Statistical Association, 43(244), pp. 
603-5.
Stolper, W.F., 1949, [untitled], Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, 262, pp. 223-5.
Stolper, W.F. & Samuelson, P.A., 1941, Protection and Real Wages, The Review of Economic 
Studies, 9(1), pp. 58-73.
Tintner, G., 1948, [untitled], Journal of the American Statistical Association, 43(243), pp. 
497-9.
Tribe, K., 1997. Economic Careers: Economics and Economists in Britain, 1930-1970, . 
Routledge, London.
von Neumann, J., Morgenstern, O., 1944. Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour, . 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Weintraub, E. R., 1991. Stabilizing Dynamics: Constructing Economic Knowledge, . 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
51
Weintraub, E.R. 2007. A personal afterword, in E Forget & ER Weintraub (eds), Economists' 
Lives: Biography and Autobiography in the History of Economics, Duke University 
Press, Durham, NC, pp. 367-70.
Weintraub, E. R. (ed.), 2014. The History of MIT Economics, Annual Supplement to History 
of Political Economy. Duke University Press, Durham, NC. (Forthcoming).
Weintraub, E.R., 2014, Telling the Story of MIT Economics in the 1940s, History of Political 
Economy. (Forthcoming).
Wilson, E.B., 1903, The So-called Foundations of Geometry, Archiv Fur Mathematik Und 
Statistik, 6(3), pp. 104-22.
Wilson, E.B., 1935, Generalization of Pareto's Demand Theorem, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, pp. 715-7.
Wolf, M.C., 1936, Symmetric Functions of Non-commutative Elements, Duke Mathematical 
Journal, 2(4), pp. 626-37.
